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Since 1999, states have wrestled with the best regulatory approach to prevent predatory 
mortgage lending in the subprime market—a problem that increases the risk of foreclosure for 
credit-strapped families and costs Americans an estimated $9.1 billion each year.1  Twenty-
eight states have taken action either by passing comprehensive reforms or by relying on 
regulations aimed at specific predatory practices. Meanwhile, lawmakers in Washington also 
have proposed bills to update federal laws, including some that would override existing state 
laws.2   
 
As lawmakers consider ways to address predatory mortgage lending, several questions are 
critical to the debate:  How well are state laws working against predatory mortgage lending?  
Which laws would serve as the best models for effective policies?  Are there negative 
unintended consequences of enacting state legislation?  And what are the potential 
consequences of overriding state laws? 
 
To answer these questions, we conducted the most comprehensive investigation ever 
undertaken on state anti-predatory lending laws. Our research examined 28 state reforms by  
analyzing six million subprime mortgage loans made over a seven-year period (1998 – 2004). 
Specifically, we compared borrowers’ experiences under reforms in each of these states to 
those of borrowers in states with minimal protections or no laws. We were further able to 
isolate and measure the effects of the reforms by controlling for differences in key economic, 
geographic, temporal, and loan and borrower characteristics. 
 
We find that state laws are working well to prevent predatory mortgage lending, but that’s not 
all. Strong laws also allow subprime credit not targeted by the laws to flourish without 
increasing interest rates for borrowers. More specifically, in states with anti-predatory lending 
laws that go beyond current federal protections, we find: 
 
• Borrowers get fewer loans with abusive terms.  
States that have implemented significant reforms generally reduced the incidence of loans 
with predatory terms, and states with the strongest laws realized the biggest gains in 
fighting predatory loans. For example, without New Mexico’s law, an additional four out 
of ten borrowers (38.5%) in the subprime market would have received home loans with 
abusive features—including prepayment penalties, balloon payments or being unfairly 
steered into a higher-cost loan.  
• Borrowers have ready access to subprime credit. 
State laws have produced no significant effect on subprime mortgage volume in the vast 
majority of states with anti-predatory lending laws. The results indicate that lenders have 
responded to state laws by fueling the expanding subprime market with mortgages that do 
not include loan terms targeted by state laws.3  
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• Borrowers pay about the same or lower interest rates for subprime mortgages.  
A central goal of predatory lending reform has been to shift lender compensation away 
from fees—both front-end charges and back-end prepayment penalties―into more 
transparent interest rates, since a borrower can refinance out of a high rate loan but cannot 
escape from high fees. With this in mind, we expected to find a combination of fee 
reductions accompanied by offsetting marginal interest rate increases. We did find that 
fees in the form of prepayment penalties were reduced, but, to our surprise, we also found 
that many families paid lower interest rates. Among states with reforms, interest rates on 
fixed-rate mortgages showed no statistically significant difference in eight states and 
actually were lower in 19.  
 
While the interest rate differences are small, they add up:  A family with a $200,000 loan 
would typically save $1,000 or more over the first three years of the mortgage in a state 
with significant protections. One possible explanation for this finding is that in states with 
reforms, lenders are unwilling to pay mortgage brokers large bonuses (yield-spread 
premiums) for mortgages with higher-than-market rates—resulting in lower interest rates 
to borrowers.  
In addition, there are strong indications that state reforms are having a positive effect on the 
national subprime market.  For example, over the course of our study, the overall incidence of 
prepayment penalties peaked at 67.7% and then dropped to 51% by December 2004. For 
balloon payments, the corresponding figures went from 13.6% to zero. 
  
Overall, these findings have two significant implications for state and federal policymakers, 
who are grappling with the best way to prevent predatory lending. First, the findings suggest 
that strong state laws like those in place in New Mexico, Massachusetts and North Carolina 
can serve as successful models. Second, the findings call into question the advisability of 
federal proposals that would nullify state efforts and substitute a weak national standard. In 
fact, this study shows that overriding state laws would be harmful—and costly—to 
consumers, since states are successfully cutting back on predatory loans without cutting off 
access to credit. From a homeowner’s perspective, it appears that mortgages protected by 
strong state laws may be the best deal in the real estate market. 
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Most abusive lending takes place in the subprime market, where unscrupulous lenders target 
vulnerable borrowers, including those with weak or blemished credit histories. Predatory 
lending can take different forms, but includes steering borrowers into a higher priced loan 
when they could qualify for a loan on better terms, stripping equity from a borrower by 
charging exorbitant fees or by levying abusive subprime prepayment penalties, and engaging 
in practices that increase the risk of foreclosure, such as making a loan without regard to the 
borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage.  
 
In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 
response to evidence of abusive practices in the mortgage lending market. The central feature 
of HOEPA’s regulatory structure is to provide extra protections for home loans made at a high 
cost. By today’s standards, HOEPA’s two-pronged threshold is quite high. To be covered, the 
loan must typically have upfront charges that are more than 8% of the loan amount, or it must 
carry an annual percentage rate (APR) above a threshold that varies with time (set at about 
12.5% in recent months). These measures stand in stark contrast to typical charges in today’s 
market where conventional 30-year fixed rate mortgages average 6.5% interest rates and 
initial fees and charges on home loans average 0.4% of the loan amount.4  HOEPA is further 
limited in scope since it does not cover loans used to purchase a home or open-end loans such 
as home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) at all. 2004 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data show that only 0.003% of loans otherwise apparently eligible for coverage are 
made above HOEPA’s thresholds.5   
 
Since HOEPA’s enactment, the subprime mortgage market has expanded an extraordinary 
fifteenfold (from $34 billion in 1994 to $516 billion in 2004),6 and the problem of predatory 
lending has grown worse.7  Unscrupulous lenders quickly found ways to circumvent 
HOEPA’s intent and to take advantage of practices permitted under the legislation. For 
example, under HOEPA an unscrupulous lender has wide latitude to impose abusive 
prepayment penalties or to repeatedly refinance the same loan without providing any net 
tangible benefit to the borrower (“loan flipping”).  
 
In 1999, North Carolina passed the first comprehensive state law aimed at preventing 
predatory mortgage lending in the subprime mortgage market. Since then,  many have passed  
specific anti-predatory lending laws to supplement federal protections aimed at ending 
abusive mortgage lending practices. The efforts of states have been modeled on HOEPA’s 
basic structure, which is to provide extra protections for home loans defined as “high cost.”   
 
Many states have strengthened HOEPA and eliminated loopholes by expanding the definition 
of points and fees that are used to determine whether a loan is categorized as “high-cost.”  
This has been a significant step in increasing protections for borrowers, especially when 
implemented in conjunction with adopting a lower “high-cost” threshold.   
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Additionally, several states have had separate regulations in place for years to address abusive 
prepayment penalties. During the study period, these prepayment penalty regulations were 
largely preempted for all except five states with applicable laws that chose to opt out of the 
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act. However, a federal regulatory change by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision that took effect in July 2003 restored these state provisions to full 
effect for non-depository finance companies, regardless of whether a state had originally 
elected to opt out. 
 
This Study in Context 
As additional states have taken action to address abusive practices in the subprime mortgage 
market, policy debates in Congress and within many state legislatures have grown more 
intense. A number of studies have been conducted that assess the effects of state laws on the 
market. Most of the research has focused on changes in loan volume in North Carolina’s 
market, since it was the first state to pass a comprehensive anti-predatory lending law. This 
report digs deeper for the “why” behind reported changes in volume, and looks at the effects 
of these laws nationwide. 
 
In 2002, the Center for Responsible Lending reported that the volume of subprime lending 
appeared to decrease in North Carolina after the state law was passed, but that the reduction 
was consistent with a decline in predatory loans that saved borrowers an estimated $100 
million in its first year.8  In 2004, researchers with the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill (UNC) also noted a decline in subprime refinanced mortgages during the period 1998 - 
2002, but found that 90% of the reduction could be attributed to fewer loans made with 
predatory terms.9  The UNC researchers concluded that their findings were “…strongly 
suggestive that the North Carolina Anti-Predatory Law is doing what it is supposed to do.”  In 
addition, the UNC study found that subprime purchase lending, which directly contributes to 
home ownership, grew substantially in North Carolina during the study period.  
 
There have been several more studies, including work from Harvey and Nigro, Burnett and 
Finkel, as well as Ho and Pennington-Cross, which use Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data and conclude that North Carolina saw a decrease in subprime market share 
apparently explained, at least in part, by a reduction in marketing.10  This tentative 
explanation is frequently bolstered by findings that borrowers in North Carolina were less 
likely to be rejected for a subprime home loan and that applications for subprime loans were 
down, suggesting a drop in aggressive “push” marketing, particularly by non-depository 
finance companies. While we do not generally find that state reforms are connected with a 
drop in subprime lending in this paper, we believe that the observed changes reported by these 
other authors could reflect, as the UNC researchers found, a reduction in loans with abusive 
features—a possibility not readily explored through HMDA data. 
 
Finally, Elliehausen and Staten analyzed data collected from nine lenders who were members 
of the American Financial Services Association (a trade organization of subprime lenders) 
and concluded that the North Carolina law was associated with a 14% drop in subprime 
lending.11  Unfortunately, it is difficult to have confidence in that report’s findings, since data 
collection for the study ended the day before the law took full effect. 
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The findings in this research are based on data from the Loan Performance Subprime Asset-
Backed Securities Database.12  The dataset included more than six million loans totaling $1.2 
trillion originated from January 1998 through December 2004. For the full seven-year period, 
we estimate that the database covers over three-quarters of the subprime market.13 
  
To analyze the data, our research involved three basic steps. First, we identified relevant state 
laws (including the District of Columbia) and their effective dates to sort loans into control 
and treatment categories (the former includes loans in states with minimal or no protections 
beyond HOEPA, while the latter includes loans in states with significant protections). Second, 
we developed and estimated multiple regression models to measure differences in loan 
volume, isolating the effect laws were having by controlling for other variables that influence 
loan originations. Third, we produced multiple regression models to estimate the effect state 
laws were having on interest rates charged to borrowers, controlling for factors that affect 
pricing.  
 
Identifying State Laws 
When examining state laws, we evaluated the strength of the laws by using protections 
available under the federal HOEPA law as a baseline. We then evaluated how the state laws 
differ in six key respects concerning a typical subprime loan:  (1) types of loans covered, (2) 
treatment of points and fees, including covered charges and amount of charges that activate 
high-cost protections, (3) prepayment penalties, (4) anti-flipping rules, (5) substantive 
protections applicable to high-cost loans, and (6) remedies available to borrowers. We 
ascribed the following traits to our typical loan profile:  first-lien, owner-occupied, 
conventional cash-out refinance from a non-depository lender, in an amount equal to that 
state’s median subprime mortgage loan for the year the law being evaluated took effect. 
Appendix 1 lists the state law criteria and how each treatment state was coded.  
 
States that received the lowest score on all six of our criteria served as the control group. We 
then evaluated state laws that provided more than the federal level of protection on any 
individual criterion against this control group. In some instances, these laws were 
comprehensive predatory lending reforms; in others, they were stand-alone provisions, such 
as a specific restriction on prepayment penalties in the subprime mortgage market.14  Further, 
all state laws with identical coding on our six criteria were grouped together and analyzed as 
one reform to help isolate the effects of the legal provisions from the idiosyncrasies of 
individual states.15 
 
It is also worth noting that at different points in time, a state could be in the control group and 
later in the treatment group. For example, Florida’s law took effect in 2002. Prior to that time, 
a loan made in Florida would have been considered to have been made in a state without 
significant protections and accordingly would have been in the control group. After that point 
The Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Lending Reforms 
 © 2006 Center for Responsible Lending 7
in time, a loan would have been considered to be made under Florida’s reform. This method 
allows us to develop the broadest possible set of control measurements against which to 
assess lending patterns in states with significant reforms.  
 
Finally, we only report on the state 
laws effective as of the end of our 
study period (December 2004). 
Although not reported here to avoid 
confusion, we also obtained results 
from previous reforms within states. 16  
So, for example, North Carolina 
implemented part of its reform in 1999 
and part in 2000, and then it 
substantively amended its reform again 
in 2003. The results in this report for 
North Carolina should be understood 
to apply to the law as it was amended 
effective 2003.17 
 
All total, we present findings for 28 
states whose substantive anti-predatory 
lending laws were in effect as of the 
close of 2004. Those states are shown 
in Figure 1. Based on our six criteria, we identified Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, and West Virginia as the states with the strongest laws. States that 
have effective protections only on prepayment penalties as measured by our criteria include 
Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin, and 
Vermont. 
 
Understanding Differences in Subprime Loan Volume 
When policymakers enact reforms to address predatory lending, they intend to remedy 
perceived abuses within the subprime market. For example, equity stripping, steering, and 
flipping are three practices that are frequently mentioned in policy debates. In equity 
stripping, borrowers lose home equity when expensive fees are financed into the loan on the 
front end or taken through a subprime prepayment penalty on the back end. In steering, 
borrowers are influenced to accept a loan with a higher-cost than that for which they are 
qualified. Finally, loan flipping is the practice of refinancing loans (sometimes multiple times 
in quick succession) primarily to create fee income for the originator, with no tangible net 
benefit for the borrower. Other concerns surfaced in predatory lending debates include the use 
of mandatory arbitration clauses that effectively deny homeowners a chance to defend their 
home in court against foreclosure arising from a predatory loan, lending without regard to the 
ability to repay the loan, and packing unnecessary and frequently over-priced products such as 
single-premium credit insurance into a loan. 
 
Figure 1:  States with Protections in Effect by 
December 2004 
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To account for policymakers’ intentional efforts to reduce abuses in the subprime home loan 
market, our study distinguishes between changes in loans with terms targeted for reform and 
changes in all other subprime loans. However, due to the limitations of our database, we were 
only able to capture certain loan terms targeted for reform, as discussed more fully below. 
 
1. Identifying loans with terms targeted for reform 
A key step in our process involves separating the subprime mortgages in our data into two 
groups—loans with terms generally targeted in states for reform and all other loans. Based on 
our review of state laws, we identify three targeted practices that can be observed in our data: 
prepayment penalties, balloon payments and steering  First, policymakers have clearly been 
concerned with the prevalence of prepayment penalties in subprime home loans. In North 
Carolina, for example, the state reform included three separate provisions addressing the 
charges. Policymakers also appear to object to balloon payments in subprime loans. Finally, 
steering seems a central concern—as evidenced by debate about two related charges, 
prepayment penalties and yield-spread premiums that support the practice. In some cases of 
steering, borrowers are induced to take a more expensive loan than that for which they qualify 
so that a broker or other originator can receive a bonus, sometimes known as a yield-spread 
premium. But lenders are unwilling to pay much of a bonus unless the borrower is locked in 
the higher rate through a prepayment penalty, as evidenced on rate sheets.18 
 
In two instances, we are able to measure loan terms directly—prepayment penalties and 
balloon payments in subprime mortgages. Our analysis of the national data reveals that 59% 
of subprime loans over our study period had prepayment penalties while 3% of subprime 
loans had balloon payments. In addition, as a proxy for the practice of steering, we measure 
the number of subprime loans made to borrowers with credit scores at or above 660 who 
provided full documentation of income, since many of these borrowers could likely have 
qualified for lower cost credit in the prime market. Notably, our analysis of the data shows 
that 14% of subprime borrowers met the definition of this criteria. Recent public comments 
from an economist at Freddie Mac suggested that their analysis indicated that 20% of 
subprime loans over the last two years went to borrowers who could have qualified for a 
prime loan.19   
 
2. Measuring differences in volume 
We next analyze the differences between subprime home lending under state reforms and 
loans made in states without significant protections. Since our principal focus is 
understanding whether predatory lending reforms are decreasing the prevalence of loans with 
terms targeted for reform, we first examine differences in the proportion of loans with such 
terms under a given law compared to the proportion of loans with targeted terms in states with 
minimal or no protections.  
 
Next, we measure whether overall subprime volume is different in those two contexts, to 
ascertain whether state laws have potentially led to a diminishment of overall credit. Finally, 
we decompose overall subprime volume into two segments and measure separately 
differences in volume of loans with and without targeted terms in states with reforms 
compared to loans made in states without reforms.  
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The volume measurements were made at the state level each month. Take, for example, the 
Florida law that became effective in October 2002. For this law we have 27 monthly 
measurements of volume (October 2002 through December 2004) that can then be compared 
to volume in states without significant reforms. As such, the results reported here in 
association with a law should be understood to be the average difference between lending 
under the law in the months the law was in effect and lending in states where there were no 
significant reforms.  
 
In each of these measurements we controlled for key economic, geographic, and temporal 
factors that one might expect to influence originations. For example, we control for the effect 
of unemployment rates, interest rates, housing prices, the year and quarter in which a loan was 
made, as well as demographic measurements such as homeownership rates. In other words, 
we are able to measure the difference between lending under a state with a reform and states 
without reforms holding all of these controlled variables constant. Please see results for the 
volume model in Appendix 2 for a full list of non-law variables controlled for in this study. 
 
3. Limitations 
It is important to recognize that data limitations prevent us from measuring the full range of 
predatory practices generally targeted by lawmakers. For example, our data do not provide 
information on the nature and extent of up-front fees or the incidence of loan flipping. In all 
likelihood, these omissions will tend to understate potential positive consequences and 
overstate potential negative consequences associated with state laws. For example, this study 
assumes that any loans that were reduced by a state law and classified as “non-targeted” did 
not include predatory features, but that may not be the case: the loan may have had high up-
front fees or may be a loan that resulted from loan flipping that did not benefit the borrower. 
Similarly, desirable changes associated with state laws are not exhaustive, since they apply 
only to the three specific practices screened in this report (subprime prepayment penalties, 
balloon clauses, and steering). 
 
Understanding Differences in Interest Rates of Subprime Home Loans 
We also examined differences in the interest rates of subprime home loans under the state 
reforms compared to loans made in states without significant protections through four loan-
level multiple regression models—one each for fixed-rate mortgages with and without 
prepayment penalties and adjustable rate mortgages with and without prepayment penalties.  
 
1. Ensuring measurements are made on similar loans 
All adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) modeled here were hybrid mortgages with a two-year 
fixed interest rate period adjusting semiannually thereafter for the final 28 years with a 
standard, fully-amortizing repayment schedule; they were the most common subprime ARMs 
by far. Further, while measuring rates, we included only loans that met certain criteria to 
ensure the measurements were fairly comparable. Both ARM and fixed-rate mortgages 
included in the model were restricted to those made to owner-occupant borrowers and secured 
by a first-lien on a single-family residence, with a 30-year term, no private mortgage 
insurance, and in an amount below jumbo loan thresholds. 
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2. Measuring differences in interest rates 
Interest rates were defined by a risk premium measured as the difference between the rate 
charged on the home loan and a baseline rate. This is an important variation on simply 
measuring interest rates directly because it helps ensure the measurements reflect the cost 
lenders assign to mortgages beyond that of the general time-value of money. For fixed-rate 
mortgages, a moving average of the yield on five-year U.S. Treasury notes was used as the 
baseline rate. For the adjustable rate mortgages, the yield on a moving average of 6-month 
LIBOR rates was used as the baseline rate. While the measurement remains risk premiums, 
this construct also allows the reported results to be interpreted directly as differences in 
interest rate. 
 
In contrast with our loan volume measurements discussed above, the measurements here are 
made on individual loans. So, for example, every loan in the data resulted in a measurement 
that was either designated as having taken place under a specific state reform or, alternatively, 
in the control group of loans made in states without significant protections. We then were able 
to measure the difference between the rates on loans in states with reforms and those in states 
without reforms. 
 
As we made these measurements, we controlled for a similar set of variables as those utilized 
in the volume models and added the following additional key control variables, reflecting the 
major determinants of interest rate pricing in the subprime market: credit score, loan-to-value 
ratio,20 loan amount,21 refinance indicator variable, income documentation variable, and 
prevailing interest rates. These variables were chosen, in part, because many had been used 
successfully by other researchers examining the factors that influence mortgage pricing.22   
 
3. Limitations 
While our data did not allow us to control for the effect of discount points, we believe this 
omission, if it were to have any effect, would tend to overstate the risk premiums associated 
with loans in states with laws. This conclusion follows from the observation that state laws 
restrict up-front charges and, consequently, make it less likely that borrowers in those states 
will pay such fees than borrowers in states with no laws or minimal protections. This, in turn, 
would mean that risk premiums (and, consequently, interest rates) were understated in states 
without laws compared to those charged borrowers in states with laws.  
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#1: In states with strong laws, families in the subprime market receive 
fewer loans with abusive terms.  
When evaluating state anti-predatory lending laws, the most fundamental test is whether they 
actually deter loans with abusive terms. We first examined differences in the proportion of 
loans that included targeted terms under state laws as compared to states that had minimal or 
no protections, controlling for the effects of other variables that influence origination 
volumes, such unemployment rates. (See Appendix 1 for results for these variables not related 
to state laws).  
 
For example, if 10 of 100 loans made under a state law had abusive terms compared with 30 
of 100 loans in the control states, all else being equal, our results would indicate that the law 
was associated with a 20 percentage point lower proportion of loans with abusive terms than 
the control states. While it is worth noting that the hypothetical state in our example still has 
10 loans with targeted terms, the fact remains that the theorized reform worked as intended. 
As a practical matter, it is difficult for policymakers to rid the market entirely of loans with 
terms targeted for reform. For example, federal law frequently operates to govern loans made 
by federally-chartered lenders without regard to state law.  
 
Nevertheless, the results of our 
analysis were striking, revealing that 
state laws are clearly working to clean 
up the subprime mortgage market. 
Figure 2 illustrates the regression 
model results with a U.S. color-coded 
map. Control states, shown in white, 
are those that had either no or 
minimal protections beyond existing 
federal law. The dark green states all 
saw a lower proportion of loans with 
targeted features under their law than 
the control states. The light green 
states saw no difference between the 
proportion of such loans in their 
market after their reform took effect 
and the control states. No significant 
state laws were associated with an 
increase in the proportion of loans 
with targeted terms relative to the 
states without significant protections.  
Figure 2:  Difference in proportion of loans with terms 
targeted for reform in states with protections, compared to 
states with minimal or no protections. 
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As the map and accompanying Table 1 illustrate, 20 states showed lower proportions of 
predatory loans. Commonly, compared to control states, states with anti-predatory lending 
laws reduced the proportion of loans with targeted terms by 30 percentage points. For 
example, Table 1 shows that the proportion of loans in New Mexico with abusive terms was 
38.5 percentage points lower than states without significant reforms.  
 
Not surprisingly, the states varied in how effectively 
they curtailed predatory lending. States with the 
strongest laws — Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and West 
Virginia — are generally associated with the largest 
declines in targeted terms relative to states without 
significant protections. Other states, such as 
Georgia and South Carolina, also experienced 
significantly fewer loans with abusive terms. Both 
of these states also have relatively strong provisions 
concerning points and fees in home loans, which 
may be a key factor in their effectiveness.23  
Conversely, states with relatively weaker provisions 
experienced smaller decreases in the proportion of 
loans with abusive features relative to the control 
states, including Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, 
Minnesota, Texas, Kentucky, and Virginia. Notably, 
all of these states have relatively lax treatment of 
either points and fees or loan coverage, or both. 
 
Of note, states with laws that only differed from 
control states in their effective regulation of 
prepayment penalties, such as Maine, may also have 
had a significant decline in loans with targeted 
terms compared to the control states. For those 
states it is likely that the indicated differences are 
overwhelmingly related to the incidence of 
prepayment penalties and do not extend to other 
abusive practices. 
 
Beyond the model results, an analysis of the 
underlying data shows that these reforms are 
positively affecting the national market. For 
example, prepayment penalties, at their zenith, were 
found in 67.7% of subprime loans during one month 
in our study, but were only present in 51.0% by December 2004. For balloon payments, the 
corresponding figures stood at 13.6% and 0.0%. For our steering proxy, the measurements 
were 19.8% and 15.5%. In states that had passed reforms, the December 2004 measurements 
were 17.7%, 0.0%, and 11.9% for prepayment penalties, balloon terms, and the steering proxy 
respectively. 
Table 1:  Difference in proportion of loans 
(in percentage points) with terms targeted 
for reform in states with significant 
protections, compared to states with 
minimal or no protections. 
 
State(s) Difference





District of Columbia -8.0 
Florida -2.5 
Georgia -43.7+++ 







New Jersey -37.0+++ 
New Mexico -38.5+++ 
New York -32.3+++ 
North Carolina -32.0+++ 
South Carolina -48.1+++ 
Texas -21.0 
Virginia -1.1 
West Virginia -16.4++ 
 
* States with similar legal provisions were grouped 
together to facilitate analysis. 
Statistically significant results are in boldface: + indicates 
95.0% confidence level, ++ indicates 99.0% confidence 
level, +++ indicates 99.9% confidence level. 
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#2: Strong state laws are not hampering consumers’ access to subprime 
credit.  
When states pass stronger laws against predatory lending, the goal is to reduce the prevalence 
of loans with abusive terms without reducing the availability of responsible mortgage credit. 
The findings reported in Figure 3 and Table 2 show that states have struck an effective 
balance: Total subprime volume in states with reforms is similar to that found in states 
without significant protections.  
 
Figure 3 shows results on state laws and overall subprime loan volume. As shown on the map, 
the laws produce no discernible pattern on subprime loan volume. Among the 28 states 
evaluated, relative to the control states, 20 had no statistically significant effect on overall 
subprime volume, six had more, and two had less. Examining Table 2 (next page), 
Massachusetts provides a useful example. Residents in that state enjoyed 1.23 fewer subprime 
home loans per month with targeted terms per 10,000 adults compared to states with minimal 
protections. For families in Massachusetts, this translates into 590 fewer loans each month 
with common abusive terms.  As the table also shows, however, this drop in abusive lending 
was offset by an increase in loans without targeted terms. 
 
The two states evaluated that 
showed less subprime loan volume 
compared to control states are 
Georgia and New Jersey. For 
Georgia, the reduction in overall 
volume is explained entirely by a 
drop in lending practices targeted for 
reform (see Table 2). In fact, while 
the state saw a decline in overall 
subprime volume relative to states 
without significant protections, the 
decline was confined to loans with 
targeted terms—loans without 
targeted terms actually increased.  
 
New Jersey’s experience suggests 
that further study may be valuable in 
this instance. As shown in Appendix 
2, Table A2, New Jersey’s per capita 
rate of subprime loans without 
certain abusive loan terms following 
the passage of its law was almost 
five times that of the control states. In fact, relative to the control states, New Jersey had the 
highest number of subprime loans without the targeted loan terms of any state in our study. 
This suggests that New Jersey has had more responsible subprime lending than any other 
state. At the same time, our study suggests that the state had fewer such loans than our models 
would have predicted. There are a number of factors that may contribute to the reason why 
New Jersey’s performance may not be well-predicted by our models, including the possibility 
Figure 3:  Change in overall subprime volume in 
states with protections, compared to states 
with minimal or no protections. 
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that New Jersey’s subprime market was already saturated prior to passage of its law. Lending 
credence to this possibility is the observation that New Mexico, which implemented an even 
stronger law at the same time, had no significant difference in overall subprime volume 
relative to states with no law or only minimal protections. 
 
While overall volume did not differ from the control states in the vast majority of states with 
reforms, the findings presented in Table 2 provide further evidence that state laws were 
effectively combating abusive lending. Nineteen states showed some significant positive 
effect—either an increase in non-targeted loans or a decrease in targeted loans, or both—
indicating that, following the implementation of state laws, market actors successfully made 
loans without targeted terms in place of loans targeted for reform.  
 
These findings further affirm the effectiveness of state laws. While overall volume showed 
little difference in states with predatory lending laws, there is a clear pattern showing that 
loans with targeted terms declined in those states, while loans without targeted terms 
increased. 
 
Table 2:  Differences in subprime volume (number of loans per 10,000 adults per month) in 






Alaska, Iowa,  Maine,  Maryland,  
Michigan, Vermont* 
0.64++ -0.57+++ 1.22+++ 
Arkansas 0.80 0.54 0.23 
Connecticut -0.11 -0.40 0.31 
District of Columbia -0.12 -0.31 0.02 
Florida 0.78 0.17 0.57+ 
Georgia -1.56+ -2.27+++ 0.95++ 
Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin* 0.41 -0.04 0.43+++ 
Illinois 0.52 -0.25 0.82++ 
Kentucky 0.28 0.27 -0.02 
Massachusetts 0.08 -1.23+ 1.22+++ 
Minnesota 1.09 0.72 0.41 
North Carolina -0.04 -0.63 0.76+ 
New Jersey -4.06+++ -1.19+ -2.49+++ 
New Mexico -0.07 -0.46 0.42 
New York 0.86 -0.38 1.14++ 
South Carolina 0.43 -0.85+ 1.29+++ 
Texas -3.59 -3.16 0.47 
Virginia 0.63 0.35 0.25 
West Virginia -0.61 -0.40 -0.20 
 
Columns represent separate model results and the second two cannot be added directly to obtain the overall volume results. 
* States with similar legal provisions were grouped together to facilitate analysis.  
Statistically significant results are in boldface: + indicates 95.0% confidence level, ++ indicates 99.0% confidence level, +++ 
indicates 99.9% confidence level. 
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#3: In states with strong laws, borrowers’ interest rates are no higher for 
subprime mortgages – and they are often lower. 
In assessing how families are affected by state laws, it is important to consider the overall cost 
of subprime loans, which is a combination of fees plus the interest rate charged. Policymakers 
have expressed concerns that state laws could result in substantially higher interest rates on 
subprime mortgages resulting from increased legal risk or compliance costs. It is worth noting 
that this concern is quite different from the marginal increase in interest rates that we would 
expect if state reforms succeeded in their goal of shifting lender compensation from fees to 
more transparent interest rates. A shifting of lender compensation is a worthwhile aim since 
borrowers can escape loans that are over-priced on interest by refinancing with responsible 
lenders, but the cost of fees charged is lost to borrowers immediately and forever.  
 
We know from the previous discussion that state laws have reduced lenders’ fees charged in 
the form of prepayment penalties on subprime loans. Surprisingly, however, our results also 
indicate that state laws have not increased interest rates and, in some cases, borrowers actually 
paid lower rates for subprime mortgages after their state laws became effective compared to 
borrowers in states without significant protections.  
 
Why would state laws lead to lower rates?  By reducing excessive fees that bring no added 
value to consumers and by reducing the prevalence of abusive loan terms, it appears that state 
laws may have produced a more competitive lending environment that offers more 
responsible subprime loans. In the process, state laws may also have driven out bad actors and 
allowed responsible lenders to offer products on more affordable terms. Finally, predatory 
lending laws may discourage lenders from charging abusive yield-spread premiums, bonuses 
paid to mortgage brokers for mortgages with higher-than-market-rates. Two reasons to 
believe this might be the case are as follows:      (1) some state laws have directly regulated 
these payments to mortgage brokers, and (2) by restricting prepayment penalties, other states 
may have made lenders less willing to rely on such payments generally since the borrower 
could refinance the day after their loan closed and the bonus was paid, denying the lender the 
benefit of a higher rate. We also note that these results are consistent with previous research 
conducted by CRL showing that advances in technology have drastically lowered the cost of 
complying with state laws.24   
 
Figures 4 and 5 show differences in interest rates compared to control states following 
implementation of state reforms. Figure 4, representing 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, shows 
that interest rates had no significant difference in eight states and actually went down in 19 
states compared to the control states. Figure 5, representing 30-year adjustable-rate 
mortgages, similarly shows that borrowers in states with reforms generally either paid roughly 
the same or actually paid lower interest rates on subprime mortgages. 
 
While the absolute value of the majority of these differences is less than 0.25%, or 25 basis 
points (bp), a decrease of just 20 bp would result in savings of $10,000 on a subprime 30-year 
home loan held to maturity.25  Even measured over a more common three-year average loan 
life, the savings are not trivial, amounting to $1,000.  
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To achieve an “apples-to-apples” 
comparison that truly captures the 
effects of state laws, both figures 
focus on mortgages without 
prepayment penalties. All lenders 
had the option to offer loans without 
prepayment penalties, but both 
federal and state rules play a large 
role in determining whether specific 
types of lenders can offer loans with 
penalties.26  Accordingly, results for 
loans with prepayment penalties 
might more accurately reflect 
changes in lenders operating in a 
market than changes attributable to 
the effects of a state law. Interested 
readers, however, can refer to 
Appendix 3 for results associated 
with loans with prepayment 
penalties.  
 
The results presented here also 
isolate the effects of state laws by 
controlling for important 
characteristics that influence the 
pricing of mortgages, including 
borrowers’ credit scores and loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios. The results 
for those and other variables 
confirm the accuracy of our 
approach, because they influenced 
rates in the expected direction and 
were well within expected ranges. 
For example, loans with higher 
credit scores were associated with 
lower interest rates, and loans with 
higher loan-to-value ratios had 
higher rates. For more results on 
variables not related to state laws, 
see Appendix 3. 
 
Since state laws are effectively 
reducing abusive lending and the 
cost of complying with those laws is 
low, homeowners appear to receive 
the benefits of more responsible 
Figure 4: Difference in Interest Rates on 30-Year Fixed Rate 
Mortgages without Prepayment Penalties in states with 
protections, compared to states with minimal or no 
protections. 
Figure 5: Difference in Interest Rates on 30-Year Adjustable 
Rate Mortgages without Prepayment Penalties in states with 
protections, compared to states with minimal or no 
protections.
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subprime loans with lower fees in the form of prepayment penalties charged and, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, interest rates that are comparable or even lower. 
 
Table 3: Difference in interest rates (in basis points) in states with significant protections, 











Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, 
Maine, Michigan, Vermont* -28.8
+++ -8.4+++ 
Arkansas -9.3 8.9 
Connecticut -5.0 2.4 
District of Columbia -13.4 70.5+ 
Florida -2.6 -20.1+++ 
Georgia 15.4+++ 3.9 
Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, 
Ohio, Wisconsin* -28.0
+++ -6.6+ 
Illinois -24.6+++ -15.0+++ 
Kentucky -14.3++ -7.8 
Massachusetts -62.8+++ 16.9 
Minnesota -29.1+++ -16.4+ 
New Jersey -32.3+++ -5.6+ 
New Mexico -6.2 5.6 
New York -68.8+++ -30.1+++ 
North Carolina 0.0  2.1 
South Carolina -41.0+++ -23.3+++ 
Texas -3.4 -29.2 
Virginia -1.4 17.3+ 
West Virginia -44.0+++ 21.1 
 
Notes: * States with similar legal provisions were grouped together to facilitate analysis.  
Statistically significant results are in boldface: + indicates 95.0% confidence level, ++ indicates 99.0% confidence level, +++ 
indicates 99.9% confidence level. 
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Predatory lending continues to be a major threat to American homeowners, as evidenced most 
recently by the Ameriquest settlement with 49 states and the District of Columbia for $325 
million.27  The research presented here shows that the states offer an excellent model for 
protecting credit-strapped families while preserving a healthy marketplace. For lawmakers 
considering reforms at the state or federal level, the findings points to a number of practical 
lessons highlighted by the states’ experience:   
 
• Strong state laws are the most effective at preventing predatory lending. States that 
enacted stronger legal protections showed larger declines in the proportion of loans with 
predatory terms compared to states with relatively weaker provisions.  In general, state 
laws that achieved the best results tended to have one or more of these characteristics: a 
broad definition of loans covered by the law that includes purchase loans and home equity 
lines of credit; prepayment penalty restrictions; and/or a broad definition of points and 
fees that includes prepayment penalties and yield-spread premiums.  Our analysis was not 
able to review the effects of state laws related to loan flipping, but it is likely that flipping 
restrictions also would have contributed to positive results in preventing predatory 
lending. 
• Laws that reduce predatory loans create a better market for borrowers and also for 
responsible subprime lenders. In most states with anti-predatory lending laws, following 
implementation, the market successfully substituted loans without targeted terms for loans 
with abusive terms, with no net effect on the overall volume of subprime lending in these 
states. 
• State laws reduce the cost of subprime mortgages. State laws reduce the fees that 
lenders charge in the form of prepayment penalties. While this study was unable to test 
whether up-front fees were also reduced, that also was an intended result. The expectation 
was that interest rates would rise to keep lender compensation constant, also an intended 
result, since interest rates are much more transparent. A borrower with rates that are too 
high can refinance with a responsible lender but cannot avoid paying exorbitant fees. 
Surprisingly, however, borrowers generally either paid lower interest rates for subprime 
mortgages than an identical borrower would have paid in a state without significant 
protections, or there was no significant difference. Even a small reduction in interest rates 
on a typical subprime loan can result in savings of as much as $1,000 per family. State 
anti-predatory lending laws already have begun producing these savings for homeowners. 
• States should continue to take action to curb mortgage lending abuses. A number of 
states still have not enacted state laws against predatory lending, or have passed laws with 
protections that are no stronger than current federal law (HOEPA). Further, some states’ 
laws have clearly had less effect in curbing abuses than others. These states should 
continue to explore ways to strengthen their approach, drawing on the models of those 
states that have most successfully reduced predatory lending and continued to provide a 
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robust subprime market that is both more affordable for borrowers and more competitive 
for responsible subprime lenders. 
• States must not lose their ability to fight abusive lending practices. Several federal 
proposals introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives have ignored the success of 
state predatory lending laws and instead have sought to protect the subprime market from 
efforts in the states to reduce abusive loans. These proposals would deliberately override 
effective state laws and prevent the states from taking further positive actions against 
abusive lending practices. A bill introduced by Reps. Ney (R-Ohio) and Kanjorski (D-PA) 
in early 2005 calls for preemption of state laws, as does a proposal put forward recently by 
Rep. Clay (D-MO).  
In addition to wiping out effective state laws, the Ney-Kanjorski and Clay bills propose 
standards that are similar to state laws that have had little or no impact on loans with 
predatory terms. For example, their bills include weak provisions against abusive prepayment 
penalties, and they leave gaps that would allow the abusive serial refinancing of loans 
(flipping). Both proposals would in some ways weaken existing federal law and open 
loopholes that would allow predatory lending practices to continue or increase.  
  
From the perspective of homeowners, the best proposal offered in Congress thus far has come 
from Reps. Miller (D-NC), Watt (D-NC) and Frank (D-MA). Their bill is directly modeled on 
existing state laws that are working as intended. Judging from the results in the states, the 
Miller-Watt-Frank bill would likely reduce predatory lending nationally and provide a more 
competitive and affordable subprime market for borrowers who need access to credit. For 
example, the bill closes loopholes that would allow lenders to avoid designating loans as 
“high cost” by ensuring that all the borrower’s costs are counted, including prepayment 
penalties. Their proposal also would require borrowers to receive counseling from a qualified 
professional before accepting a high-cost loan.  
 
Further, rather than thwarting the states’ ability to govern local real estate markets, the Miller-
Watt-Frank bill offers strong federal protections as a floor – not a ceiling. States would 
continue to have the freedom to address any local issues that arise. For example, if a state 
experiences a rash of foreclosures as a result of “innovative” predatory lending practices, the 
state would be in a much better position than the federal government to act swiftly and 
appropriately to address that particular situation. If HOEPA had preempted states from 
passing laws back in 1994, then North Carolina never could have prohibited the financing of 
single-premium credit insurance, a predatory practice all but wiped out in the U.S. mortgage 
market through advocacy that began with that law. 
 
The direct experience of states with strong and comprehensive laws offers a rare preview of 
how specific legislative approaches affect the marketplace. State predatory lending laws 
began as a new initiative in North Carolina, and today the “experiment” has expanded to more 
than two dozen states. The results are in, and they are positive: stronger protections against 
predatory loans, access to more responsible home loans and, it turns out, lower fees and often 
even lower interest rates. Strong state laws have been good for millions of consumers while 
supporting a thriving marketplace. To find a model for new national legislation, many 
lawmakers need look no further than their own backyards. 
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Appendix 1: Categorizing State Reforms 
 
 
Figure A1 and Table A1 respectively report the criteria used to evaluate state protections 
against predatory lending and the outcomes for specific state laws reported on in this paper 
that result from the application of those criteria to a typical subprime home loan. We 
ascribed the following traits to our typical loan profile:  first-lien, owner-occupied, 
conventional cash-out refinance from a non-depository lender, in an amount equal to that 
state’s median subprime mortgage loan for the year the law being evaluated took effect. 
Not shown or reported in other results are outcomes for state laws in effect in those states 
prior to the effective date of the most recent reform.  
 
Figure A1: State Law Criteria 
Coverage 1—Fails to satisfy 2 or 3 
2—Existing HOEPA coverage plus open-end loans 
3—Satisfies 2 and includes all loan types (conventional and government-
insured, without regard to purchasing entity) 
 
Points and Fees 1—Fails to satisfy 2 or 3 
2—Threshold lower than existing HOEPA plus either prepayment penalty or 
yield-spread premiums included in fees measurement 
3—Threshold lower than existing HOEPA plus both prepayment penalty and 
yield-spread premiums included in fee measurement or equivalent (e.g., yield-





1—Regulation preempted by federal law, limited to high-cost only, or allows 5 
year terms or amounts of 6 months’ interest on at least 80% of amount 
prepaid/3% or more of the amount prepaid. 
2—Restricts term or amount of penalty further 
3—Restricts term and amount of penalty further 
 
Flipping Protections 1—Fails to satisfy 2 or 3 
2—Requires lender to consider appropriateness of loan for a borrower on some 
refinancing transactions below the high-cost threshold. 
3—Requires lender to consider appropriateness of loan for a borrower on all 
refinancing transactions below the high-cost threshold 
 
High-Cost Loan Protections 1—Fails to satisfy 2 or 3 
2—Requires pre-loan counseling, bans prepayment penalties, or limits financed 
fees to level below high-cost points and fees threshold 
3—Requires at least two of the above 
 
Remedies for Violations of  
High-Cost Protections 
1—Fails to satisfy 2 or 3 
2—Provides private cause of action with damages equivalent to those available 
under federal law for violations of HOEPA 
3—Satisfies 2 and permits borrower to defend home against a loan purchaser 
initiating foreclosure of a loan with violations of high-cost protection standards, 
without exception. 
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Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, 
Maine, Michigan, Vermont Various 1 1 3 1 1 1 
Arkansas 2004 1 2 2 1 2 2 
Connecticut 2002 2 1 1 1 2 1 
D.C. 2002 2 1 3 1 2 2 
Florida 2002 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Georgia 2003 3 3 1 1 2 2 
Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, 
Ohio, Wisconsin Various 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Illinois 2004 1 1 3 3 1 3 
Kentucky 2003 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Massachusetts 2004 3 3 2 2 3 3 
Minnesota 2003 2 1 3 1 2 1 
New Jersey 2004 3 2 3 1 3 3 
New Mexico 2004 3 3 3 3 3 3 
New York 2003 3 3 3 1 2 3 
North Carolina 2003 3 2 3 3 3 3 
South Carolina 2004 1 2 3 2 3 2 
Texas 2001 1 1 3 1 3 1 
Virginia 2003 1 1 2 2 1 1 
West Virginia 2000 3 3 3 2 3 3 
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Appendix 2: Volume Models 
 
 
We examined several changes in subprime originations under the various reforms through 
four state-level multiple regression models. First, we examined whether state laws 
decreased the proportion of loans with terms targeted for reform in these laws compared 
with states that lacked significant protections. Second, we examined whether overall 
subprime loan volumes had been depressed following the implementation of a reform. We 
chose to confine our measurements to the number of adults in each state, because this 
measure most accurately reflects potential borrowers and because of the high-quality 
estimates available from the U.S. Census Bureau. Finally, our third and fourth models 
extended the analysis of our overall volume model by considering differences in loans with 
and without targeted terms, respectively. These measurements served as our dependent 
variables and were measured at the state level each month. 
  
To ensure that we were accurately isolating the effect of state laws, we controlled for 
various factors that one might fairly expect to affect volume either by influencing demand 
for mortgages directly or by altering the cost of credit. In addition, our models controlled 
for unobserved differences among the states. The control variables in our models fell into 
six categories:  
 
• Time: year, quarter, serial correlation of observations;1 
• Region; 
• Economic factors: slope of the yield curve, difference in yields across credit grades, 
interest rate volatility, and the volatility of state housing prices; 
• Judicial foreclosure status;2 
• Geographic factors: state personal income, state unemployment, state housing 
prices, urban status, and a series of zip code level factors thought to be related to 
demand, including income, poverty, unemployment, homeownership rates, as well 
as race and ethnicity; and 
• Unobserved differences between states not related to the studied reforms. 
 
The model results reported here explain a substantial amount of variation in the dependent 
variable. While the final models presented here do not allow for an r-squared calculation,3 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) version of the four volume models using the same 
independent variables resulted in r-squared calculations ranging from 67-69%. Moreover, 
the final form models presented here all were significant improvements on the OLS 
versions. 
 
Table A2 reports univariate results for the state laws, as discussed in the text. Table A3 
provides results for the non-law variables. 
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Table A2: Univariate Analysis of volume by state law, reporting mean (standard deviation). 
 
Overall Volume  












Loan Volume  








3.24 (2.42) 0.50++ 3.44 (1.63) -3.73++ 1.25 (1.55) -0.74++ 1.92 (1.42) 1.26++ 
Arkansas 2.31 (0.50) -4.70++ 8.26 (0.38) 0.08 1.91 (0.46) -3.74++ 0.39 (0.07) -0.90++ 
Connecticut 6.17 (1.99) 1.47++ 7.84 (0.52) 0.06 4.87 (1.77) 1.19++ 1.27 (0.33) 0.28++ 
District of Columbia 2.82 (0.62) -0.51+ 5.40 (0.57) -2.06++ 1.52 (0.43) -0.94++ 1.28 (0.27) 0.44++ 
Florida 9.04 (2.55) 3.86++ 8.37 (0.47) 0.53++ 7.61 (2.40) 3.53++ 1.38 (0.27) 0.32++ 




3.04 (1.81) 0.30+ 6.93 (1.63) -0.24+ 2.08 (1.47) 0.09 0.90 (0.79) 0.24++ 
Illinois 7.54 (1.26) 0.53 2.93 (0.24) -5.25++ 2.21 (0.50) -3.44++ 5.27 (0.79) 3.98++ 
Kentucky 3.05 (0.44) -3.47++ 8.88 (0.35) 0.67++ 2.69 (0.41) -2.60++ 0.34 (0.09) -0.84++ 
Massachusetts 4.80 (1.33) -0.83 4.75 (1.99) -2.98 2.39 (1.57) -1.95 2.37 (0.26) 1.12 
Minnesota 7.38 (1.27) 0.86+ 7.91 (0.38) -0.30+ 5.83 (1.14) 0.54 1.51 (0.24) 0.33++ 
North Carolina 4.09 (0.82) -2.65++ 2.64 (0.17) -5.57++ 1.08 (0.26) -4.38++ 2.96 (0.53) 1.74++ 
New Jersey 7.15 (1.29) 0.33 1.43 (0.10) -6.66++ 1.01 (0.15) -4.48++ 6.12 (1.15) 4.81++ 
New Mexico 3.85 (0.57) -3.16++ 1.81 (0.16) -6.37++ 0.70 (0.14) -4.95++ 3.10 (0.41) 1.81++ 
New York 4.58 (0.71) -1.42++ 4.66 (0.54) -3.42++ 2.14 (0.46) -2.68++ 2.43 (0.38) 1.29++ 
South Carolina 4.28 (0.80) -2.73++ 2.24 (0.22) -5.94++ 0.95 (0.22) -4.70++ 3.28 (0.59) 1.99++ 
Texas 5.28 (0.88) -1.24++ 5.34 (0.42) -2.87++ 2.82 (0.62) -2.47++ 2.42 (0.30) 1.24++ 
Virginia 6.62 (1.67) 0.10 7.94 (0.18) -0.27++ 5.22 (1.32) -0.07 1.35 (0.33) 0.17 
West Virginia 1.34 (0.28) -5.18++ 4.59 (0.60) -3.62++ 0.61 (0.13) -4.68++ 0.72 (0.17) -0.46++ 
 
Notes: The columns under “difference” reports observed volume under the state law minus the volume of the control states 
during the same time period. To test whether the difference is statistically significant, we used Cochran’s T-Test assuming 
unequal variances between two groups (control and the “treatment” legal regime).  
* States with similar legal provisions were grouped together to facilitate analysis.  
+ significant at 95% level, ++ significant at 99% level, and +++ significant at 99.9% level. Notation carried forward in future 
tables. 
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(# of loans/ 
10,000 adults/ 
month) 




0.0037+ -0.0006 0.0029 0.0014 
State 
Unemployment 
-0.018 -0.0314++ -0.0286 0.0215 
State Housing 
Prices 
-0.0137+++ 0.0028+ -0.0197+++ 0.0007 
State African-
American Pop.  
0.9935 -0.0912 1.0048 -0.2559 
State Hispanic Pop.  -0.1130 2.5039+ 4.7699 -3.5101 
Economic Controls 
Yield Curve Slope 0.0820+ -0.0786+++ 0.0314 0.2811+++ 
Credit Spread 0.1666+ 0.1976+++ 0.3642++ 0.2198 
Rate 0.1642+++ 0.0101 0.2120+++ -0.0390 
Rate Volatility -0.4073 -0.2828+ -0.4165 1.1347+++ 
State Housing Price 
Volatility 
-0.0257 -0.0137+ -0.0818++ 0.0255+ 
Region 
GLAK -2.2465 -0.2654 -2.8126 0.4153 
MEST -1.0523 0.0705 0.5625 -1.1092 
NENG 0.8598 -0.2405 2.4358 -1.2409 
PLNS -2.6999+ -0.4955 -4.2075+ 0.4012 
RKMT -1.3191 -0.2432 -2.5308 0.4205 
SEST -2.8599+ -0.3479 -3.9961+ -0.0002 
SWST -1.8931 -0.5905 -4.4088 0.9903 
Judicial Foreclosure 
Jud2 -0.8811 0.0025 -0.8096 -0.6665 
Jud3 -0.7380 0.0459 -1.2550 -0.2672 
Jud4 -1.2275 -0.1859 -1.9654 0.4086 
Time 
Q2 0.1212+++ 0.0153 0.1344+++ 0.1846+++ 
Q3 0.1613++ 0.0029 0.1416+ 0.3717+++ 
Q4 0.2596+++ 0.0425 0.2869+++ 0.3781+++ 
Y99 0.0787 -0.0805+ -0.0714 0.9360+++ 
Y00 0.0044 -0.1219 -0.2621 1.2981+++ 
Y01 0.2451 -0.0479 0.0451 1.5697+++ 
Y02 0.5571+ -0.0414 0.3309 2.1058+++ 
Y03 0.6925+ 0.0311 0.4912 2.2632+++ 
Y04 0.2349 -0.1797 -0.2046 2.5964+++ 
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Appendix 3: Additional Rate Model Results 
 
 
As was the case with volume models, the final form models used here do not allow for a 
direct calculation of an r-squared measurement.4  However, OLS versions of the four 
models that utilized the same independent variables yielded r-squared calculations that 
ranged from 56-60%. Again, as was the case with the volume models, the final form 
models presented in this report were all significant improvements on the OLS versions. 
 
Table A4: Difference in Interest Rates (in basis points) in states with significant protections, 












Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, 
Maine, Michigan, Vermont* -15.7
+++ -6.9+++ 
Arkansas -18.8+++ -8.9+ 
Connecticut 15.2+++ 14.1+++ 
District of Columbia 20.2 -2.9 
Florida -13.1+++ -11.7+++ 
Georgia -3.4 16.5+++ 
Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, 
Ohio, Wisconsin* -12.9
+++ -4.1+++ 
Illinois -0.6 -4.5+ 
Kentucky -0.8 1.9 
Massachusetts -104+++ 6.5 
Minnesota -17.4+++ -7.9+++ 
North Carolina 45.2+++ 9.8 
New Jersey -24.4 24.9 
New Mexico -41.9 -84.1+ 
New York -41.2+++ -66.4+++ 
South Carolina -9.1 10.6 
Texas -19.3 5.2 
Virginia -18.4+++ 3.8 
West Virginia 27.4+ 30.4+ 
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Intercept 1251.127+++ 1433.069+++ 1166.849+++ 1313.036+++ 
FICO -1.106+++ -1.082+++ -1.167+++ -1.194+++ 
Loan Amount ($0,000s) 
(3SLS predicted) 
-2.249+++ -2.048+++ -1.943+++ -2.038+++ 
LTV (3SLS predicted) 12.561+++ 18.405+++ 16.091+++ 13.369+++ 
Refinance indicator -5.438+++ -29.380+++ -11.586+++ -13.948+++ 
Low or No Income Documentation 14.062+++ 38.313+++ 45.343+++ 44.284+++ 
Time 
Y99 -12.601+++ -23.052+++ 4.211+ 4.208+++ 
Y00 23.724+++ -12.636+++ 9.980+++ 29.379+++ 
Y01 60.424+++ 22.435+++ 44.658+++ 26.446+++ 
Y02 -3.016 -81.424+++ 27.259+++ -6.904+ 
Y03 -15.766+++ -115.837+++ -15.203+ -61.909+++ 
Y04 -37.476+++ -154.023+++ -46.474+++ -106.591+++ 
Q2 -20.370+++ -25.775+++ -8.458+++ -7.563+++ 
Q3 -6.916+++ -21.857+++ -7.009+++ -12.784+++ 
Q4 -10.189+++ -26.205+++ -16.741+++ -22.276+++ 
Region 
GLAK 23.124 38.556+ 34.446 47.575+ 
MEST 31.569 33.410+ -13.411 9.428 
NENG 24.153 36.502+ -2.184 -10.164 
PLNS 41.792+ 53.464+++ 88.028+ 76.904+++ 
RKMT -6.118 3.999 53.485 35.032+ 
SEST 29.214 46.932+++ 60.746+ 57.447++ 
SWST 26.165 24.511 85.318+ 72.079++ 
Economic 
Yield Curve Slope -29.997+++ -49.966+++ 8.170+++ 0.185 
60-Day Rate Moving Average  
(5-Year US Treasury for FRM, 6-
Month LIBOR for ARM) 
-39.354+++ -38.408+++ -76.047+++ -76.142+++ 
Rate volatility -9.464+ -95.481+++ 98.750+++ 44.914+++ 
Credit Spread 109.191+++ 104.906+++ 56.984+++ 53.966+++ 
Volatility in Housing Prices  0.134 -0.352+++ 1.432+++ 1.110+++ 
Judicial Foreclosure 
JUD2 -2.132 -11.799 -9.265 -12.125 
JUD3 -0.893 -24.007+ 15.922 4.021 
JUD4 2.432 13.409 24.399 15.447 
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State Personal Income ($000s) 0.045+++ 0.050+++ 0.127+++ 0.010 
State Unemployment (%) -4.175+++ 1.453++ 0.796 4.878+++ 
State Housing Prices  0.030+ 0.009 0.117+++ 0.119+++ 
Zip Code Income ($000s) -1.660+++ -1.658+++ -1.881+++ -1.245+++ 
Zip Code Income Squared 0.009+++ 0.010+++ 0.011+++ 0.007+++ 
Zip Code Poverty (%) 1.168+++ 0.771+++ 0.497+++ 0.140+ 
Zip Code Unemployment (%) 0.102 0.245+ -0.248 0.254++ 
Zip Code Homeownership rate (%) 0.402+++ 0.234+++ 0.349+++ 0.153+++ 
Zip Code ratio Hispanic: 
Non-Hispanic White 
-0.546+++ -0.679+++ -0.392+++ -0.000+++ 
Zip Code ratio African-American: 
Non-Hispanic White 
0.002+++ 0.240+++ -0.021 -0.013 
Central city status  
(Reference-Non-MSA) 
-1.753+ -5.129+++ -1.936+ -3.450+++ 
Non-central city status  
(Reference-Non-MSA) 
-7.894+++ -9.417+++ -5.357+++ -5.750+++ 
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Notes on Appendices 
                                                 
1 Technically speaking, the serial correlation of the observations was controlled through a one-step 
autoregressive process and was not an independent variable.  Similarly, the unobserved differences between 
states were treated as random effects and were not modeled as independent variables with fixed effects. 
2 This variable was taken from B.W. Ambrose, M. LaCour-Little, A.B. Sanders, The Effect of Conforming 
Loan Status on Mortgage Yield Spreads: A Loan Level Analysis, Real Estate Economics 32(4): 541-569 
(2004). 
3 The final form volume models were mixed models. 
4 The final form interest rate models were mixed models with state effects modeled as random effects to 
preserve degrees of freedom. 
